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In recent years Western advocacy groups have achieved unprecedented success in mobilising 
Europeans and North Americans (particularly in the US) behind a ‘conflict minerals’ 
campaign to help end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). They have 
also attracted strong criticism, both internationally and in the DRC, for the perceived negative 
impact of their work. Over the last three years I have been working on a documentary, We 
Will Win Peace, which is part of this critique. As one local activist told us during the making 
of the film, ‘the advocacy led by these organisations, we hadn’t understood the goal, as 
Congolese…If we had been informed before of their intentions, we could have done 
something.‘ Similarly, speaking to a group of small-scale rural cultivators, one said ‘we didn’t 
understand what was happening or why such a decision had been made…No-one explained to 
us what was going on.’ So what was the goal, and what is going on? 
While it is important not to conflate the work of all DRC-focused advocacy organisations 
under the same umbrella, central to the success of the ‘conflict minerals’ campaign was the 
emergence of a dominant narrative that placed Western consumers at the heart of the solution. 
The story went that armed groups operating in the eastern DRC were raping women to access 
and control mineral resources, and that if Western consumers exert pressure on electronic 
giants like Apple and Samsung to stop purchasing these minerals, they can prevent rape and 
help end the conflict. In the US, celebrities and sports stars were engaged by the Enough 
Project to help promote the campaign, whose message appealed particularly strongly to 
student groups and middle and upper-class liberals. 
The campaign eventually led to policy successes in both Washington and Brussels. In 2010 
(and as We Will Win Peace documents), the Enough Project’s lobbying was instrumental in 
having Congress pass Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which asks all companies 
registered on the US stock market to reveal their supply chains to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) when sourcing gold, tin, tungsten or tantalum from the eastern DRC or 
neighbouring countries. In 2014, the European Trade Commissioner proposed European 
Union ‘conflict minerals’ legislation for discussion, which Amnesty International, Global 
Witness and a broad coalition of European NGOs are now lobbying to be strengthened. 
The foundations of the ‘conflict minerals’ campaign can be traced back to 2001, when a UN 
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC submitted its 
first report to the Security Council, recommending an immediate embargo on the trade in 
minerals from the eastern DRC due to their systematic exploitation by armed groups as a 
means to finance their activities.[1] Numerous NGO and other reports followed, and in 2008, 
UN Security Council Resolution 1856 strengthened the UN peacekeeping force’s mandate to 
combat the issue. 
However, there were three shortcomings to the ‘conflict minerals’ campaign that came out of 
this work. First, it misrepresented the causal drivers of rape and conflict in the eastern DRC. 
Second, it assumed the dependence of armed groups on mineral revenue for their survival. 
Third, it under-estimated the importance of artisanal mining to employment (particularly of 
young men), local economies, and therefore – ironically – security. Compounding these 
shortcomings, there was a fatal flaw to the US legislation enacted in 2010: at the time Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, it was not possible for companies sourcing minerals 
from the eastern DRC to determine whether those minerals were or were not contributing to 
conflict. 
As a result and due to confusion over the implications of the legislation, international buyers 
withdrew, and an effective mineral boycott enveloped the region. With minerals the only cash 
export of note from the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, and artisanal mining the 
main off-farm source of employment, the socio-economic impact on Congolese living in the 
region was severe, and continues to be felt today. Many lost their jobs or were forced into 
more precarious labour, as the legislation inadvertently (but quite predictably) strengthened 
the black market in smuggling minerals to ‘clean’ markets outside of the DRC (see this Open 
Letter, signed by a coalition of more than 70 Congolese and international experts, for a more 
detailed analysis of the campaign’s shortcomings and impact). 
Today, the policy solution pursued in the DRC by a range of foreign companies, NGOs and 
donors revolves around an expansion of the Congolese state into areas formerly beyond its 
control, in order to establish and oversee mineral certification and traceability systems that 
can attest to their ‘conflict free’ status. Early evidence from artisanal mine sites piloting the 
first of these systems suggests the process is catalysing the previously lethargic formalisation 
of artisanal mining, and with it the establishment of formal land tenure agreements.[2] In so 
doing, the process provides conditions that might be amenable to forms of post-conflict 
(capitalist) development that has eluded the region for so long. However, this is contingent 
upon internal dynamics beyond the control of external actors, and will not take place 
overnight. Indeed, this is an oft-heard refrain by those who defend the campaign and the 
impact of Dodd-Frank 1502. While conceding that the short- and now medium-term impact 
has been harmful to many Congolese, the argument is made that the policy is aimed at long-
term change. 
Meanwhile, ‘en attendant’, the change enacted negatively affects the lowest classes of labour 
and already marginalised social groups by accelerating and creating new processes of 
dispossession, economic exclusion and social differentiation (albeit built on pre-existing 
inequalities). Herein lies the main tension in the work of Western advocacy organisations, and 
the reason they attract such strong critique: there is a heavy dissonance between their stated 
constituency and their actual constituency, or who they work for and who they work with. 
Reading the reflections of the radical American organiser Saul Alinsky, two major themes are 
apparent in his work.[3] First, the need to simplify your message to mobilise people from 
apathy to action. On this point, the ‘conflict minerals’ campaign has been extremely effective. 
Where the campaign falls short, however, is the second theme in Alinsky’s work, which is 
how close he always was to the constituency he represented. He either lived in the community 
he was helping organise, or he had been invited in to help them pursue solutions to problems 
they themselves defined (to paraphrase Alex van der Waal, himself a strong and vocal critic 
of what he has labelled ‘designer activism’).[4] Yet the relationship between advocacy 
organisations headquartered in Western capitals and their supposed constituency of 
marginalised or disadvantaged African groups is far more tenuous. 
This is because often, the organisations have no permanent presence in the countries affected 
by their policy successes. Even for those who do have an in-country office much of their time 
is spent working with government, business and other elites in national and provincial capital 
cities. The majority of people who stand to be most affected by the policy outcomes of their 
advocacy, living in rural and peri-urban areas, will not have met them nor know who they are. 
One of the most striking elements during the making of the film was the difficulty of finding 
Congolese people in these areas who both knew about and were supportive of the ‘conflict 
minerals’ campaign, beyond a narrow but influential consortium of church leaders. Indeed, 
many bemoaned the lack of engagement with the Congolese classes and social groups who 
stood to be most directly impacted by policy change in Western capital cities. While the 
advocacy organisations use images of the poorest and most vulnerable in their marketing 
material, in reality they work predominantly with elites, and the disruptive and contingent 
process of state-building they engage in and promote often works against the very people they 
claim to represent. 
And so, to return to the ‘conflict minerals’ campaign, organisations such as the Enough 
Project claim that progress is being made, and critics counter that on the contrary, harm is 
being done. There is truth to both claims, but they are focused on different aspects of the same 
process. To resolve this tension and to respond to the criticism, Western advocacy 
organisations are faced with a choice. They could change how they market their interventions 
and talk about their work. Helping strengthen the state in peripheral countries such as the 
DRC is a legitimate pursuit, not least as history tells us that an interventionist state is a 
necessary prerequisite to lessening dependency and advancing capitalist development in the 
Global South. However, it will likely be difficult to mobilise people and funding around long-
term goals that are contingent and that entrench new forms of class conflict that negatively 
impact the poorest and most marginalised. 
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, they could reorient their efforts to working not 
just for but with the non-elites they use to promote their public image and in whose name they 
justify their external interventions. What their work would lose in structural impact, it would 
gain in honesty and legitimacy, both in the DRC and abroad. The groups and classes of 
artisanal miners, peasants and other informal workers we spoke with would come to know 
more concretely who the organisations are, and influence more strongly the direction of their 
work. They would also provide more appropriate solutions to their own problems and 
struggles than the pursuit of overseas policy change which fails to respond to their local 
needs. 
Ben Radley is a PhD candidate and film-maker based in Kinshasa and working on the 
re-emergence of industrial mining in South Kivu Province, with a focus on how foreign 
direct investment enters into and influences local labour and accumulation regimes.  
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